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Abstract
This policy paper summarizes four corridor studies on bilateral social security
agreements (BSSAs) between four European Union (EU) member and two
nonmember states, draws conclusions on their results, and offers recommendations.
BSSAs between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries are seen as the
most important instrument to establish portability of social security benefits for
internationally mobile workers. Yet, only about 23 % of international migrants profit
from BSSAs and their functioning has been little analyzed and even less assessed.
The four corridors studied (Austria-Turkey, Germany-Turkey, Belgium-Morocco, and
France-Morocco) were selected to allow for comparison of both similarities and
differences in experiences. The evaluation of these corridors’ BSSAs was undertaken
against a methodological framework and three selected criteria: fairness for
individuals, fiscal fairness for countries, and bureaucratic effectiveness for countries
and migrant workers. The results suggest that the investigated BSSAs work and
overall deliver reasonably well on individual fairness. The results on fiscal fairness are
clouded by conceptual and empirical gaps. Bureaucratic effectiveness would profit
from information and communication technology-based exchanges on both
corridors once available.
JEL Classification: D69, H55, I19, J62
Keywords: Acquired rights, Labor mobility, Migration corridor, Administration,
Evaluation
1 Introduction
The share of individuals living outside their home country is increasing again after a
temporary low in the 1960s, reaching 3.3 % of the world population in 2015 (up from
2.8 % in 2000), or an estimated 244 million people (United Nations—Department of
Economic and Social Affairs 2015). In 2013, non-European Union (EU) citizens resid-
ing in EU-28 numbered 20.4 million or 4 % of the EU population; the share of the
foreign-born population in 2013 was 7 % and is rising (Eurostat 2015). Overall, the
IZA Journal of European
Labor Studies
© 2016 The Author(s). Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and
indicate if changes were made.
Holzmann IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:17 
DOI 10.1186/s40174-016-0067-0
world’s population seems to be in a new phase of migration movements, soon to match
and exceed the migration peaks in mankind’s history (Manning 2013; Maunu 2014).
This rising share of individuals living temporarily or permanently abroad broadly re-
flects three developments: (a) globalization, which besides the expanding trade in goods
and services and the movement of capital also increasingly includes the international
mobility of labor; (b) population aging, which in the most advanced countries implies a
stagnating or even falling domestic population, creating pull/push effects from coun-
tries with an exploding young labor force; and (c) military conflicts, terrorism, and en-
vironmental degradation, all of which create waves of migrants in search of protection
and better lives.
As a result, the migrant stock numbers outlined above—impressive as they may
be—underestimate the underlying labor mobility dynamics, that is, the number and in-
creasing share of individuals who have lived or will live at least some part of their work-
ing or retired life outside their traditional country of residence. While this development
is difficult to quantify due to individuals’ multiple migration spells, sometimes to mul-
tiple countries, indications from across the world are strong that time spent abroad is
increasing. In the EU, the number of citizens who spend at least some of their adult life
living outside their home country (as a student, intern, intra-firm and inter-firm mobile
employee, labor migrant, or “snowbird” retiree) is definitely rising and may soon be as
high as one out of every five individuals. Labor migration pressure toward Europe and
labor market needs within Europe have been prevalent for some time and will intensify
with population aging. These phenomena are conjectured to be particularly pro-
nounced for the EU’s neighboring countries across the Mediterranean and build on mi-
gration movements that started as early as the 1960s.
Based on past cross-border labor flows dating back several decades, an indicator of
the magnitude and dynamics of pension benefit portability is the number or amount of
pension benefits paid abroad as a share of total benefits. Table 1 offers available but not
easily accessible information for the investigated labor-receiving countries: Austria,
Germany, Belgium, and France.1 For the smaller countries, Austria and Belgium, the
share of number of benefits paid abroad is around 10 % and rising but not linearly. For
the larger countries, France and Germany, the magnitudes are less but are rising mark-
edly for Germany as measured by the number of beneficiaries abroad and rising slowly
for France, as measured in benefit expenditure. The French euro value measure under-
estimates the magnitude compared to that of Belgium as it relates the flows sent abroad
from a subset of pension schemes (that is, without civil servants and so on) to the total
expenditures of all schemes (no comparable data accessible). The difference in benefit
numbers and euro amounts flowing abroad represents the lower benefits for returning
migrants, reflecting their shorter contribution period and often lower wage levels.
For internationally mobile workers, two issues are crucial: (a) the access of workers
and their families to social security benefits while working abroad and (b) the portabil-
ity across borders of acquired rights/benefits in disbursement when they move on or
retire to a different country of residency. Working foreigners and their families are ba-
sically interested in all social benefits and as a starting position of policy analysis, they
should face no discrimination in benefit access compared to local workers. This policy
perspective may change with regard to temporary migrants, particularly seasonal
workers, in as far as their needs’ profile differs from that of long-term migrants
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(Holzmann and Pouget 2012). For foreign workers moving to another country for work,
returning to their home country, or retiring in a third country, what matters is that
benefits in disbursement or rights in accumulation are not forfeited (that is, benefits in
disbursement are exportable and rights in accumulation are fully portable to the new
country of residence).
In principle, there should be little objection to benefit exportability and acquired
rights portability if they are based on prior contributions and eligibility is established
Table 1 Total number or amounts of pensions and those paid abroad: 2004, 2010, and 2014
Austria













Total 2,041,997 1,114,867 2,219,923 1,494,763 2,310,749 1,615,382
Paid abroad 225,662 128,396 257,062 172,212 273,035 118,484
In % 11.1 % 11.5 % 11.6 % 11.5 % 11.8 % 11.7 %
Germany













Total 24,253,612 16,647,948 24,932,492 17,541,732 25,164,401 17,687,735
Paid abroad 1,385,244 930,146 1,577,562 1,094,328 1,724,688 1,219,670
In % 5.7 % 5.6 % 6.3 % 6.2 % 6.9 % 6.9 %
Belgium













Total 1,727,310 n. a. 1,791,526 n. a. 1,938,773 n. a.
Paid abroad 164,243 n. a. 178,899 n. a. 190,477 n. a.
In % 9.5 % n. a. 10.0 % n. a. 9.8 % n. a.














Totalb 1,314,388 n. a. 1,703,300 n. a. 2,000,523 n. a.
Paid abroadb 53,358 n. a. 64,151 n. a. 78,783 n. a.
In % 4.1 % n. a. 3.8 % n. a. 3.9 % n. a.
France
2004 2010 2012














Totalc 224,087,790 170,930,510 286,139,250 240,094,700 314,750,890 249,740,950
Paid abroadd 4,055,016 3,835,745 6,005,777 5,781,392 6,282,827 6,082,105
In % 1.8 % 2.2 % 2.1 % 2.4 % 2.0 % 2.4 %
Sources: Austria: Hauptverband der oesterreichischen Sozialversicherunsgtraeger, Oesterreichische Sozialversicherung in
Zahlen, jaehrlich
Germany: Deutsche Rentenversicherung, Rentenbestand am 31.12, jaehrlich
Belgium: Office National des Pension (ONP), Statistic annuelle des beneficiaires de prestations
France: Centre des Liaisons Européennes et Internationales de Sécurité Sociale (CLEISS), annuelle
aIncludes beside old-age pensions also survivors and disability pensions, where applicable
bMonthly payment, workers and self-employed (ONP)
cYearly total expenditure (Eurostat)
dYearly expenditure (CLEISS)
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according to the contingency of the (social) insurance contract: they are essentially akin
to property rights. Both migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries should be in-
terested in making benefits easily portable, as this enhances the advantages of an inter-
nationally mobile labor force. If factors for benefit eligibility or its termination (for
example, number of children, end of unemployment, end of sickness, or end of life)
cannot be properly observed abroad, however, then exportability of social benefits may
become restricted. Furthermore, acquired rights based on contribution financing have a
major savings component that by itself is not easily established; consequently, neither is
the correct amount due for transfer. Even if acquired rights are fully aligned with indi-
vidual contribution efforts, social benefits typically contain often a major redistributive
component that is difficult to establish; even more difficult is determining how much
to transfer across borders or to be repaid.
This policy research paper focuses on the functioning of bilateral social security
agreements (BSSAs) based on four migration corridor studies undertaken during 2013/
2014 under a World Bank project. The paper thus fills an important institutional know-
ledge gap in the policy discourse of international labor mobility. While the portability
of social security has received increasing attention over the last decade—starting essen-
tially with Holzmann et al. (2005) and including a recent review of literature (Taha et
al. 2015)—no attempt has been made to date to explore the functioning of its claimed
key institution: BSSAs. Do BSSAs really deliver on what is expected and what are the
key areas of concern and improvement? The Austria-Turkey, Germany-Turkey,
Belgium-Morocco, and France-Morocco corridors represent well-established migration
corridors that reflect both similarities and differences.2 These similarities and differ-
ences across the selected corridors allow for some first conclusions and offer insights
to formulate recommendations for policy reforms and next research steps.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 contains a brief introduction to the
basic conceptual issues on portability. The objectives, methodology, and process for the
four corridor studies are presented in Section 3. Section 4 highlights the similarities
and differences in the BSSAs’ workings across the four migration corridors. Section 5
summarizes the extent to which the BSSAs fulfill the three proposed evaluation criteria.
Finally, Section 6 offers conclusions and recommendations.
2 Conceptual considerations on the international portability of social
benefits
Discussions and agreements on policies and their instruments fare better if there is a
shared understanding of their objectives and conceptual underpinnings. If divergent in-
terests exist between different parties, such an understanding helps identify the source
of the differences. The working definition of portability used herein is: “Portability is
defined as the ability to preserve, maintain, and transfer social insurance rights vested
or on disbursement, independent of nationality and country of residence.”3
To offer a conceptual background around this definition and the issues presented in
the later sections, this section briefly discusses six conceptual domains (drawing on
Holzmann and Koettl 2015 and Holzmann et al. 2005):
(a)The three key dimensions of interest in portability
(b)The prevalence of portability between countries
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(c)Difficulty in establishing portability
(d)Benefits that should be portable
(e)Policy options to establish portability
(f ) Criteria for the selection of portability instruments
2.1 Three key dimensions of interest in portability
In principle, establishing portability of social benefits should be straightforward, as
three key considerations—economic, social, and human rights (Holzmann and Koettl
2015)—favor it.
From a first-best economic point of view, an individual’s labor mobility decisions should
not be influenced by the lack of portability of social benefits for which she/he has estab-
lished acquired rights. Efficiency is increased by the absence of any distortionary obstacles
toward portability.4
From a social policy point of view, such acquired rights are a critical element of an
individual’s (or family’s) life cycle planning and social risk management. Denying port-
ability, particularly once the mobility decision has been made and cannot be reversed,
risks upsetting the life cycle planning of individuals and families and creating substan-
tial welfare loss.
From a human rights point of view, individuals have the right to social protection
according to national legislation and international conventions and these rights should
carry over when they leave the country or profession. A key question is whether these
human rights apply only to acquired (contributory) rights or to all social rights. As they
are resource consuming, economic and social trade-offs will emerge.
2.2 The prevalence of portability between countries
Despite this rosy picture on the desirability of portability, the reality is more sobering.
Table 2 offers the magnitude of portability regimes by countries’ income group: Regime I
(portability) signals the existence of a BSSA independent of its depth but typically cover-
ing pension benefits. Regime II (exportability) indicates migrants in countries that have
no BSSA with their home country but allow the export of cash benefits, once eligibility is
established. Regime III (no access) indicates migrants in countries with no access to social
insurance programs, which means no mandated contribution obligation but also no pen-
sion or other benefits on return. Regime IV (informal) offers an estimate of the share of
migrants who are informal in the country, with no contributions to pay and no benefits to
take back.
Only 23 % of the stock of migrants in the world are subject to BSSAs, and of this
favored group, the large majority (86 %) are migrants from high-income countries liv-
ing in other high-income countries. These estimates, based on dated 2000 migrant data,
may have improved somewhat due to, among other things, the EU’s proliferation of
portability legislation and its conclusion of framework agreements with several neigh-
boring countries.
A large share of migrants (55 %) live and work in countries that allow cash benefits,
once established, to be exported (often restricted to pension-related benefits). However,
this may still not happen, as many countries have waiting periods of 10 or more years.
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While the number of BSSAs between developed and developing countries has in-
creased over the years, they may still be of limited value to migrants from countries
with low coverage rates. These migrants typically come to developed countries with no
or limited acquired rights, and if they return to their (low-income) home country be-
fore retirement, few acquired rights may be added. This limits the benefits to those
who acquire rights abroad under social insurance provisions, and the loss of top-ups
and the lower quality of health care services may lead individuals to choose not to
return.
2.3 Why is portability difficult to establish?
Political support for portability across countries is typically limited, as immobile labor
by far dominates mobile labor in both volume and influence. This is evident in coun-
tries where mobility between the public and private sectors remains limited and special
schemes remain in place. This lack of political support is consistent with the develop-
ment of national schemes, which typically started with narrowly focused coverage on
sectors (trades) and then expanded from civil servants to white- and then blue-collar
workers, to farmers and the self-employed, and lastly to the voluntarily insured. This
fragmentation within countries is not conducive to establishing portability across coun-
tries. Thus, portability considerations for the design and implementation of schemes
have only slowly been incorporated, coinciding with the rise in labor mobility. However,
domestic considerations are still given priority in the social protection area (unless they
contradict EU objectives or ratified International Labour Organization (ILO) conven-
tions). The situation is similar or worse in countries where benefit eligibility is linked
to length of residency. Portability of benefits is, at first sight, an alien concept.
Technical reasons for limited portability are largely linked to the following:
Table 2 Global migrant stock estimates by origin country income group and portability regime,
2000











Low-income countries (number) 850,985 36,720,832 5,293,338 10,757,086 53,622,241
% of total 2 68 10 20 100
Lower-middle-income countries (number) 11,312,511 47,224,671 3,476,163 14,473,805 76,487,150
% of total 15 62 5 19 100
Upper-middle-income countries (number) 3,521,212 10,724,671 189,357 7,203,975 21,639,215
% of total 16 50 1 33 100
Non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD) high-income coun-
tries (number)
2,063,914 3,534,415 192,987 57,809 5,849,125
% of total 35 60 3 1 100
OECD high-income countries (number) 24,778,310 3,658,850 291,007 189,802 28,917,969
% of total 86 13 1 1 100
Total (number) 42,526,932 101,863,439 9,442,852 32,682,476 186,515,699
Source: Holzmann and Koettl 2015, based on Avato et al. 2010 and Holzmann et al. 2005
aLegal migrants with access to social security in the host country in the absence of a bilateral or multilateral arrangement
bLegal migrants without access to social security in their host country
cUndocumented immigrants
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(a)The pseudo insurance nature of benefit determination, which does not allow a
straightforward split of acquired rights into (i) a contemporaneous insurance
component that is consumed in any period and hence incurs no portability issue;
(ii) a pre-savings component that all benefits have to some extent and that could be
made portable if its value could be easily established; and (iii) a redistributive com-
ponent within and between benefit cohorts that can be huge (as in the case of trad-
itional defined pension benefit schemes or health care benefits based on income-
related contributions). The redistributive character of benefits is responsible for
long vesting periods that internationally mobile workers may not fulfill in a single
country but could easily if the insurance periods in all countries were added up
(that is, totalized).
(b)The tax treatment of contributions and benefits that allows for front- or back-
loading of taxation for the three stages of contribution payment, return receipt, and
benefit disbursement under a tax-exempt-exempt or exempt-exempt-tax regime, re-
spectively. This leads to tax expenditures under an exempt-exempt-tax regime that
are not necessarily recovered or reimbursed with a mobile workforce. Tax consider-
ations are one main reason why even migrant-perfect (funded or unfunded) defined
contribution (DC) plans continue to meet major obstacles in cross-country portabil-
ity, albeit the savings component is clear and the redistributive component typically
nil.
2.4 Which benefits should be portable?
For what benefit types of social security does one want to establish portability: for all or
only a subset and based on what criteria?
Social security covers both social insurance and social assistance programs. The dif-
ference can be framed through the financing—social security contributions versus gen-
eral government financing—but is also related to the contingencies to be covered and
the extent to which they lend themselves to insurance considerations or reflect general
redistributive/anti-poverty considerations.




 Workers’ accident and occupational diseases
 Sick pay and maternity benefits
 Severance pay
 Unemployment benefits
 Family benefits (such as children/family allowance)
 Health care benefits
 Long-term care benefits for the elderly
 Income replacement benefits for the care of children and sick or elderly people
While all benefits may be important from a social policy angle, not all are relevant
from a labor market standpoint, as not all bias mobility decisions in a relevant manner.
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For such decisions, the long-term benefits—old-age and health care—are quite likely
the most important. Furthermore, for a number of the contingencies listed above, it is
difficult to determine the “state of the world,” that is, whether the risk situation (for
example, unemployment) is still valid. In others, the quantities (for example, number of
children) or price (for example, long-term care costs) cannot be correctly observed.
Thus, cost-benefit considerations are required that may call for a more comprehensive
benefit package for a set of countries with tight labor market integration (such as
within the EU) than that for country corridors with separate labor markets and unidir-
ectional labor flows.
2.5 Policy options to establish portability
Essentially two approaches are used to establish portability: (a) changing the benefit
design to make benefits as portable as possible without government action and (b) es-
tablishing portability arrangements at the unilateral, bilateral, and/or multilateral level.
These two approaches are both substitutes and complements.
The key feature of changing the benefit design is to distinguish explicitly between the
period insurance element and the pre-funding element of social benefits in addition to
making any redistributive action outside the benefit scheme. While this may have lim-
ited bearing on the portability of benefits in disbursement, having a clearly identified
pre-funding element should substantially ease portability for all social insurance-type
benefits, except, perhaps, family benefits. For cash benefits, this is accommodated by
the (partial or full) move from a defined benefit (DB) to a DC-type structure. DC bene-
fits are inherently more portable than defined DBs.
A range of portability arrangements can be used to enhance or fully establish port-
ability. Most portability discussions focus on BSSAs, but the scope of arrangements is
much larger and includes the following:
 Unilateral actions (UAs): UAs can be taken by a country when individuals have
established acquired rights; UAs can improve portability through full exportability
of benefits in disbursement and of acquired rights.
 BSSAs: BSSAs are the centerpiece of current portability arrangements between
countries. While in principle, they can cover the whole range of exportable social
benefits, BSSAs focus mostly on long-term benefits such as old-age, survivor’s, and
disability pensions and, to a much lesser extent, on health care benefits.5
 Multilateral Arrangements (Mas): MAs represent a general framework of
portability for a group of countries for all or a subset of social benefits. These
general rules are typically supported by more detailed BSSAs. The best known
and most developed MA is the one among EU member states that is actually
not an MA but a decree-based instrument that creates supranational EU law.
Traditional MAs have been established in Latin America (MERCOSUR) and the
Caribbean (CARICOM) and in 15 French-speaking countries in Africa
(CIPRES); one was recently established between Latin America and Spain and
Portugal (Ibero-American Social Security Convention); and one is under devel-
opment for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries.
The EU is also leading efforts to enhance social security cooperation within the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.6
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 Multinational providers (MPs): A promising approach is to use the services of
multinational (private sector) providers, at least for supplementary benefits in
health care and old age. MPs exist and function well for health care benefits; for
example, Vanbreda (recently renamed Cigna), a Belgium service provider, services
World Bank staff and retirees residing in Europe and is used by the European
University Institute. MP arrangements have been discussed and sometimes
implemented, for supplementary pensions of international workers in multinational
enterprises.
2.6 Considerations and criteria for the selection of portability instruments
A variety of considerations (objectives) can be raised to support the demand for full
portability of social benefits. Ultimately, they boil down to two: fairness and efficiency.
Fairness considerations can be raised at the individual and country levels. If an indi-
vidual has contributed (mandatorily or voluntarily) to programs to mitigate future risks
to allow him/her to smooth consumption across the main risks in his life, then
acquired rights should be portable over time and between countries, as a matter of fair-
ness. Similar considerations apply at the country level. If an individual moves between
countries, denying him/her portability of acquired rights provides a windfall profit for
the home country while potentially burdening his/her new host country, both of which
are unfair.
Efficiency considerations of portability are closely linked with the labor market but
go beyond. Full portability should render the labor mobility, labor supply, and residence
decision independent of social benefits. In the absence of full portability, individuals
(and families) may decide not to migrate or return or may decide to offer labor in the
informal sector, possibly with stark implications for the overall tax revenues and eco-
nomic growth of their home country.
To assess whether portability arrangements succeed in delivering on fairness and effi-
ciency considerations, three broad results criteria have been suggested (Holzmann et al.
2005; Holzmann and Koettl 2015) and are used in this paper:
 Criteria 1: No benefit disadvantage with regard to pension and health care for
migrants and their dependents. Movements between host countries or back to the
home country should not lead to lower pension benefits or gaps in health coverage
than if one stayed in one country.
 Criteria 2: Fiscal fairness for host and home countries. No financial burden should
arise for the social security institution of one country while the social security
institutions of the other country benefit from any provisions on portability or the
lack thereof.
 Criteria 3: Bureaucratic effectiveness. The administrative handling of portability
should not cause an undue bureaucratic burden for the countries’ institutions
involved and should be easy to handle for migrants.
3 Investigating the four BSSAs: design and implementation
BSSAs establish the portability of social benefits between two countries and thereby
serve multiple goals, including defining which social benefits will be coordinated
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(“material scope”); defining the individuals covered under the agreement (“personal
scope”); establishing the depth of coordination (from time-limited exemptions to con-
tribute to the host scheme to exportability of benefits to full-fledged coordination); and
establishing coordination on eligibility criteria, benefit calculation, disbursement, ser-
vice delivery, financing, and processes of application, decision, and information.7
To be effective, to deliver on their overall objective, and to detail their goals, BSSAs
should ensure the following:
 Equality of treatment: This refers to the principle that all workers engaged in
remunerated labor should enjoy equal provision of social security; this provision
can also be extended to workers’ dependent family members.
 Payment of benefits abroad (exportability): The principle provides for any acquired
right, or right in the course of acquisition, to be guaranteed to a migrant worker in
one territory even if it has been acquired in another.
 Determination of applicable legislation: This principle ensures that the social
security of a migrant worker is governed at any one time by the legislation of only
one country. Three basic rules apply:
Employees are covered by the legislation of the contracting country in which they
work, even if they reside in the other contracting country.
Self-employed persons are covered by the legislation of the contracting country in
which they perform their economic activity.
Civil servants are covered by the legislation of the contracting country within
whose administration they are employed.
 Maintenance of benefits in the course of acquisition (totalization): This principle
provides that when a right is conditional upon the completion of a qualifying
period, a migrant worker’s periods of employment in each country are considered.
 Administrative assistance: This principle aims to provide for mutual administrative
assistance between the social security authorities and institutions of participating
members.
BSSAs between countries are considered by most or all of the social security profes-
sion as the key instrument to establish portability for mobile workers. Although some
call the approach “state of the art,” no substantiated proof exists for such an assertion.
Neither a regional nor a worldwide inventory of BSSAs has been conducted to describe
their basic features in a comprehensive, analytical way (for example, type of benefits
covered, depth and type of coordination on such benefits). To the author’s knowledge,
no other qualitative study even less so any quantitative analysis has ever been under-
taken and published to explore the functioning of BSSAs, to highlight the strengths
and weakness of their operation, or to evaluate them against predefined criteria8; this
assessment resonates with a recent review of literature (Taha et al. 2015). A very first
and incomplete attempt in this direction was undertaken by Holzmann et al. (2005)
based on information gathered for a few migration corridors. While incomplete, the
study showed the potential power of corridor studies. Corridor studies have some trad-
ition in the analysis of migration flows and integration issues.9
BSSAs in four corridors with two migrant-sending and four migrant-receiving coun-
tries were chosen for this study—Morocco’s agreements with Belgium and France and
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Turkey’s with Austria and Germany. The selection of corridors was guided by consider-
ations of (a) proximity of migrant-sending country pairs, to allow for better comparabil-
ity of differences and (b) diversity with regard to experience. The Austria/Germany-
Turkey agreements are considered mature and advanced, as they included health bene-
fits from the beginning. The Belgium/France-Morocco agreements included some other
short-term benefits from the beginning but were only recently revised to include/
propose comprehensive health care benefits.
To put the four corridors and their BSSAs into perspective, Table 3 presents the
number of BSSAs for each country across the corridors. The data for the USA and
Japan are included for comparison. The picture that emerges is straightforward. In con-
trast to other main industrialized countries in the world—Australia, Canada, Korea,
Japan, and the USA—all European host countries have a focus on the Balkans and
northern Africa as relevant migration destinations, while those with a colonial past
(particularly France) also favor Sub-Saharan Africa. The sending countries have BSSAs
with other main European countries and Canada plus a number of neighboring coun-
tries. In contrast, Japan and the US’ BSSAs are only with other highly industrialized
countries, with one exception each for an emerging economy (Brazil and Chile, respect-
ively). This is particularly surprising for the USA, which has main migration corridors
with essentially all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and a very strong one
with Mexico. For the latter migration corridor, a BSSA was drafted in 2004 but has not
yet been signed and implemented.
The research focused on each BSSA’s effectiveness in facilitating portability of pen-
sions (old-age, disability, survivor’s) and health care benefits, as these are the core (or
only) benefits typically covered by BSSAs between southern and northern countries. In
addition, the analysis covered family benefits (family allowances), as their history and
current status differ markedly across the corridors. Thus, the selected corridors provide
a useful starting point for understanding the functioning of BSSAs, as their scope of
Table 3 Number of bilateral social security agreements across corridor countries in 2015
Country Number of BSSAsab Of which, south-north partner countries
Austria 15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldavia, Montenegro, Philippines, Serbia, Tunisia, Uruguay
Germany 17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia FYR, Morocco, Montenegro, Serbia,
Tunisia, Uruguay
Turkey 22 Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Luxemburg, Norway, Netherlands, Sweden,
Switzerland
Belgium 25 Albania, Algeria, Congo, Dem. Rep., Bosnia-Herzegovina, India, Kosovo,
Macedonia, Moldavia, Philippines, Serbia, Tunisia
France 41 Algeria, Benin, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cameroon, Congo, Dem. Rep., Gabon, Mali,
Niger, Philippines, Tunisia, Turkey
Morocco 16 Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Netherlands, Quebec, Sweden
USAc 25 Chile
Japand 15 Brazil
Source: National Social Security Institutions
aBSSA signed and enacted as of 2015
bFor EU countries, 31 more corridor arrangements are added resulting from the other 27 member states plus the other
four countries within the European Economic Space that have the same legal status (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway,
and Switzerland)
cAll other BSSAs are with European countries, Australia, Japan, and Korea, and no developing or emerging economy
dAll other BSSAs are with European countries, Australia, Korea, and the USA, and no developing or further
emerging economy
Holzmann IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:17 Page 11 of 35
coverage varies somewhat over time, as do the history and relationships between the
signatories, but the principles on which they are based are largely similar.
The corridor study approach comprised preparation of three main sets of background
documents before evaluating each BSSA against the three criteria. The first set of docu-
ments concerns country and corridor profiles on relevant topics. The second set relates
to development of a relevant dataset and selection of key performance indicators. The
final set contains the minutes of in-depth interviews with key stakeholders in the BSSA
process.
In the first set of documents, the respective researchers established four types of pro-
file documents relevant to the BSSA for each corridor: (a) a migration profile that
sketches migration stocks and flows and key labor market characteristics for the corri-
dor countries; (b) social insurance profiles of each corridor country, with a focus on
portability-relevant contingencies; (c) a profile of the BSSA, including benefits covered,
rules/instruments applied to achieve portability, rules of coordination, motivation for
the BSSA, and special issues; and (d) a profile of each country’s national social insur-
ance institutions and their administrative support for BSSAs, with a focus on adminis-
trative arrangements and processes (for example, information and communication
technology support, application, decision, and disbursement), compared to national
applicants and international best practice.
Work on the second set of documents started with identification of a wish-list of data
considered desirable and relevant for the analysis, with the intent to develop a result
matrix that would bring together the BSSA’s objectives and outcomes (as measured
against the three criteria) with the related inputs, including the BSSA’s regulations. It
soon became apparent that the desired data were extremely sparse and often simply
not available or comparable across countries, impeding researchers’ ability to imple-
ment this approach in full. For example, some countries’ data do not distinguish
whether host country nationals living abroad (to whom pensions are distributed) are
return migrants or temporary residents (snowbirds). Further, the level of naturalization
across all corridors is remarkable, albeit not identical. All else constant, different levels
of naturalization lead to different numbers of people remaining with a foreign passport,
while the number of those born abroad is the same. As some countries do not allow
collection of information about those born abroad, determining who receives a pension
abroad gets complicated. As a result, the initial objective to develop and use a set of
key performance indicators had to be dropped due to lack and/or comparability of rele-
vant data.
The third set of documents consisted of in-depth interviews undertaken with two
types of participants in the BSSA process: (a) representatives from ministries and/
or social security institutions in charge of BSSA design and implementation and
(b) nongovernmental organizations involved in the topic, such as migrants’ associa-
tions. This qualitative research proved very productive to gain major insights into
substance, process, and issues around portability and BSSAs. While the interviews
are referred to in the corridor studies, for reasons of confidentiality, they cannot
be made public.
Based on these country-specific documents and a first joint assessment of BSSAs in
the east corridor (Austria and Germany with Turkey) and in the west corridor (Belgium
and France with Morocco),10 individual corridor studies were prepared.11
Holzmann IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:17 Page 12 of 35
4 Similarities and differences of BSSAs across the four migration corridors
By design of the selection process, the four corridors and their BSSAs have a number
of similarities. However, the analyses revealed similarities that go well beyond the obvi-
ous. A number of idiosyncratic and systemic differences emerge that reflect the political
preferences of the respective migrant-receiving and migrant-sending countries.
To explore and present the BSSAs’ similarities and differences, Section 4 is structured
as follows: Section 4.1 describes the migration history of the four corridors; Section 4.2
highlights the contents of the four corridors’ BSSAs and offers a summary evaluation;
Section 4.3 and Section 4.4 offer the details of pension and health care benefits,
respectively; and Section 4.5 briefly presents information on family benefits, as this
topic had the most divergent results of all benefits covered under the BSSAs.
4.1 Migration developments
In all four migration corridors, the BSSAs’ origins are found in the labor migration of
the 1960s and the reaction to post-World War II labor shortages in Austria, Germany,
Belgium, and France. Migration flows have existed between Morocco and France (and
to some extent Belgium) since World War I and World War II, given the participation
of Moroccan soldiers on the side of the allies, but this was mostly war related and tem-
porary. No sizable migration flows existed between Turkey and Austria/Germany
before 1960.12 The relocation of civil populations between the two wars from and to
the former Turkish Empire was one of the largest government-sponsored relocations in
mankind (Manning 2013).
Migration from the early/mid-1960s to 1973/74 was a publicly organized labor flow
between participating migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. By objective
and design, the flow was temporary, with little concern for family unification or long-
term prospects in the migrant-receiving country. The four corridors’ BSSAs from the
1960s served as instruments of attraction and competitiveness; similar BSSAs were
signed with the former Yugoslavia by Austria and Germany and by Belgium and France
with Algeria and Tunisia.
The first oil price crisis in 1973 changed the migration regime and outlook, as large-
scale labor recruitment was abruptly stopped and never resumed. Furthermore, over
the next 10 years or so, a number of one-off actions were initiated in some countries to
induce temporary migrants to return home voluntarily. For those (and the majority)
who decided to stay on, family unification became important and dominant in the mi-
gration flows. In addition, a constant flow of labor migrants continued on all corridors
at a lower scale. The data indicate larger gross flows of immigration and return migra-
tion, with net flows partly negative for Austria and Germany in recent years.
Estimating the stock of migrants from the two migrant-sending countries in the re-
spective migrant-receiving countries is complicated due to naturalization—which differs
both in nature and scope between the east and west corridors. In all corridors, the first
(and second) generation has given rise to the second and third generations born in the
migrant-receiving country. In Belgium and France, this gives rise to the right of citizen-
ship latest at the age of majority as the principle of “ius solis” applies; in addition, new-
comers may acquire citizenship according to the rule of time of presence and gainful
occupation. In Austria and Germany, the principle of “ius sanguinis” applies, whereby
Holzmann IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:17 Page 13 of 35
the right to citizenship depends on at least one parent having citizenship, while again
newcomers may acquire citizenship according to the rule of time of presence and gain-
ful occupation, although the specific criteria have changed over time.
As a result, the naturalization rate between Austria-Germany and Belgium-France
differs, while the share of individuals with a migration background does not. Further-
more, the national data in France and Belgium do not allow differentiation of individ-
uals by their place of birth/ethnicity. Hence, a pension sent from France or Belgium to
a resident in Morocco can be differentiated by the resident’s nationality (assuming s/he
has only one), but if it is a French or Belgian citizen, no differentiation can be made
based on his/her ethnic background/country of birth.
Table 4 offers a summary of data and estimates on the number of individuals with a
migration background in their respective migrant-receiving countries and their signifi-
cance in the respective corridors’ migrant-sending countries.
Table 4 exhibits the similarities and differences between the corridors and countries.
Overall, the share of population with a migration background is strikingly similar in all
four migrant-receiving countries, ranging from 17.7 to 19.5 %. These data and the
notion of individuals with a migration background are relatively well-defined and used
in Austria and Germany (albeit not strictly comparably even between these countries).
Migration background is not legally defined in Belgium and France, but the concept is
used by researchers to estimate comparable data. The definition typically comprises
individuals born abroad or to parents of whom at least one was also born abroad or as
foreigner (that is, the second generation). Across the four migrant-receiving corridor
countries, almost one person in five is considered to have a migration background.
For the two migrant-sending countries, the data indicate broad similarities, but
Austria and Germany’s populations have slightly more residents with a Turkish back-
ground (3.3 and 3.6 %, respectively) compared to Belgium and France’s share of the
population with a Moroccan background (2.1 and 2.9 %, respectively).
The share of those from migrant-sending countries who keep their original citizen-
ship (and are not yet naturalized) is telling and not surprising. In countries with the
principle of “ius solis,” only about 0.7 % of the total population, or one third to one
quarter of the population with the respective background population, live as foreigners
in the migrant-receiving country. Both values are much higher in countries with the
principle of “ius sanguinis”: 1.3 and 2.0 %, respectively. As result, less than half of the
Table 4 Population, migration background, and foreign citizenship












Austria (2012) 8452 1600 17.7 275 3.3 113 1.3
Germany (2011) 81,754 15,962 19.5 2956 3.6 1607 2.0
Belgium (2011) 10,951 2023 (2005)a 19.3 290a 2.9 80 0.7
France (2011) 63,294 11,800 (2008)b 18.6 1314 (2008)b 2.1 435 (2010)c 0.7
Source: Corridor studies; Poulain and Perrin 2008; Wikipedia: Demographics of Belgium; Demographics in France; INSSE
recensement 2008 and INSSE recensement 2010
aPoulain and Perrin 2008
bINSSE recensement 2008
cINSSE recensement 2010
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population with a Turkish background have German citizenship and less than 40 %
have Austrian citizenship. The differences between Germany and Austria also reveal
differences in their naturalization processes.
4.2 The BSSAs in the four corridors
All four BSSAs date from the mid-/late-1960s and have seen few changes (Table 5).
Austria and Germany’s BSSAs are essentially unchanged except for corrections in scope
(Austria) and process (Germany). Belgium and France’s BSSAs had an even longer shelf
life and were revised only recently; most importantly, they added an extension in health
coverage.
The individual BSSAs’ scopes of coverage are quite different and are aligned by
east and west corridors (Table 6). The Austria-Turkey and Germany-Turkey
BSSAs focus essentially on pensions and health; health was included from the
very beginning, an outlier among the BSSAs then (and to some extent even now).
Family allowances were included initially but eliminated in the Austria-Turkey
BSSA when it was canceled in 1996 (and not included in the otherwise identical
BSSA of 2000).
From the very beginning, the BSSAs for Belgium-Morocco and France-Morocco had
a larger scope of benefits in cash but until their recent revisions did not include port-
ability of health care benefits for retirees, as mandatory health care insurance coverage
was introduced in Morocco only in 2005.
All four BSSAs studied are based on the same two basic principles of BSSAs. Port-
ability of social benefits exists only (a) for those based on contributions/acquired rights
(that is, principle of contribution base) and (b) for which a corresponding benefit exists
in the other country (that is, principle of reciprocity). However, the latter principle is
violated by the payment of family benefits, which exists in Germany but not in Turkey.
The following picture and questions emerge from the initial and summary assessment
of the BSSAs in these four corridors that are detailed in the subsections below:
 The four BSSAs reflect the migration situation of decades ago and the labor market
goals of the 1950s and 1960s. Albeit significant changes have occurred in both the
migration and labor market situation, relatively few changes have taken place in
these BSSAs over the years. Revision of the two BSSAs in the west corridor has
proven to be lengthy and difficult.
Table 5 The origin and status of the BSSAs
Date of first
BSSA
Date of current BSSA Envisaged revision
Austria-
Turkey
1966 2000, unchanged except family allowance 1966 BSSA
terminated in 1996
Not at the moment
Germany-
Turkey
1964 1984 Suppl. Aide Memoire (AM), 1974 Interim AM,
1969 Changing AM
Not at the moment
Belgium-
Morocco
1968 May 2014, with Administrative Agreement, effective





1965 May 2011, with convention as of October 2007 Revision under
implementation
Source: Holzmann et al. 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d
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 The four BSSAs are broadly similar but quite different in structure and details, and
the BSSAs’ language is much less harmonized than expected with regard to what
and who are covered and how coverage is defined and implemented. The source of
these differences is unclear (for example, there are major differences in the BSSAs’
underlying institutional setup and structures) as is whether these differences
actually matter for the large majority of those insured or only for a few marginal
cases.
 For pension benefits in the broad sense (that is, old-age, survivor’s, disability, and work
injury and occupational diseases), no significant conceptual and operational issues
seem to exist, except for the nonexportability of noncontributory benefits (top-ups),
administrative issues around documentation readiness and information, and the
taxation of benefits in disbursement.
 For health care benefits, more unsolved conceptual and operational issues prevail
about how best to establish individual and fiscal fairness, albeit the systems in place
broadly deliver the benefits and services due.
 Family benefits and the allowance for children staying in the home country of the
(foreign and national) worker remain a topic of conceptual and operational
controversy across the four BSSAs.
4.3 Pension portability
Seven key issues matter for individuals with acquired pension rights across country
borders.
4.3.1 Totalization of insurance periods
For waiting periods of individual countries (and thus exclusion from eligibility) to not
become effective, totalization of insurance periods is at the core of any BSSA (as far as
earnings-related schemes are concerned) and is a feature of all four reviewed BSSAs.
The relevance of totalization is proportional to the length of the waiting period (5 years
in Germany; 15 years in Austria, as well as in Belgium and France for their first-tier
schemes).
4.3.2 Timely calculation of benefits
The timeliness of the benefit calculation depends on how records of insurance periods
are prepared within individual schemes and on the presence or degree of electronic
Table 6 Scope of benefit coverage under the four BSSA corridors (as of January 2015)





































Source: Holzmann et al. 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d
aUnilaterally canceled by Austria in 1996
bUnilaterally covered by Germany and at reduced level for children abroad
cNot yet operational
dLimited to four children if paid abroad
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exchange between schemes. Timely preparation and electronic exchange exist in
Austria and Germany, are absent in Belgium and France, and are also lacking in Turkey
and Morocco. In the latter two countries, information is only put on paper when an
application arrives and the exchange between the different funds also takes place in
paper form. This substantially lengthens the application process. Turkey plans to apply
an electronic format as of 2017. No plans for electronic exchange exist in Morocco.
However, since 2013, Caisse Nationale de Securite Sociale (CNSS) has developed elec-
tronic forms, for instance, for birth and death certificates. Thus, electronic formats have
been partially implemented in Morocco (CNSS) but not to facilitate portability.
To calculate benefits, according to its BSSAs, the east corridor applies only the “dir-
ect method”; that is, once eligibility is established, the benefit for each country is calcu-
lated according to national rules. According to its BSSAs, the west corridor applies the
“European (double) method” and calculates the benefits for the totalized insurance
period before assigning each country payments through pro rata apportioning. The re-
sult of the pro rata method is compared to that using the direct method, and the better
result is selected (see Table 7 for an example). While called the European method, it is
not consistently applied between all EU countries (for example, between Austria and
Germany). According to interviews with the social security administration, results differ
little between the methods, as recent reforms have established closer contribution
benefit links.
4.3.3 Full exportability of acquired rights
Full exportability of acquired rights (that is, no benefit reduction because of, say, pur-
chasing power considerations) is typically a basic ingredient for a BSSA and has specific
relevance if an individual country’s legislation imposes reductions when sending the
pension benefit abroad. This was the case for German pensions, which paid only 70 %
of the pension benefit due if the pension was paid abroad to a country without a BSSA
in place (for example, to a Turkish retiree residing in South Africa with a German
Table 7 Example of portable pension benefits calculated with direct and pro rata methods
Benefit background and assumption for state A and state B
• In state A, a full (basic) pension of €800 per month is paid to those who have been insured for 40 years (2 %
for each year), provided they have been insured for at least 20 years.
• In state B, a pension of 50 % of the maximum national pension (€1000) plus 1 % for each year is paid to
those who have been insured for at least 25 years; the maximum insurance period considered is 50 years.
• The worker has insurance periods of 18 years in state A and 24 years in state B.
Direct calculation
• No contracting party can pay a pension under national law solely on the insurance period completed on their
territory.
• The aggregated (totalized) insurance periods, however, are 42 years and satisfy entitlement conditions in both
states.
• State A calculates the pension on 18 years and therefore pays 18 × 2 % of €800 = €288. In state B, 50 % of the
maximum national pension does not depend on the length of periods completed, so from this part, only 24/
30 would be payable. State B therefore pays a monthly pension of 24/30 of 50 % of €1000 + 24 × 1 % of
€1000 = €400 + €240 = €640. This gives the worker a total pension of €288 + €640 = €928.
Pro rata calculation
• Again, no contracting party can pay a pension under national law but under the totalized insurance periods
of 42 years.
• With 42 years of insurance, the theoretical amount for full insurance in state A is €800 and in state B is 50 %
and 42 × 1 % of €1000 = €920.
• Prorating these amounts makes state A pay 18/40 × €800 = €360 per month (note that the fraction used is not
18/42 as the maximum insurance period in state A is 40 years). The pension to be paid by state B is 24/42 ×
€920 = €526 (rounded) per month. This gives the worker a total pension of €360 + €526 = €886.
Source: Author, adjusted from Furat 2011
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pension). This regulation was abolished on October 1, 2013 (as only a few pensions
were concerned).
4.3.4 Nonexportability of noncontributory benefits due to lack of reciprocity
Nonexportability of noncontributory benefits (pension top-ups) is quite likely the most
contentious issue in all four corridors. All four investigated EU member countries have
some form of minimum income guarantee in old age, with means-tested top-ups
granted if the own pension benefit level plus other income is below the guaranteed in-
come level in old age (Ausgleichszulagenrichtsatz fuer Alterspensions in Austria; Garan-
tie de revenus aux personnes âgées in Belgium; Allocation de solidarité pour les
personnes âgées in France; and Grundsicherung im Alter in Germany). Yet, none of
these EU member countries allow the export of the top-ups to supplement benefits
paid abroad.
Table 8 offers the magnitudes of these minimum income guarantees and examples
for top-ups as of January 1, 2016. The latter are calculated assuming a common net
pension level of €470 in all countries, an assumed amount of own pension that may be
broadly representative of potential return migrants. If correct, the top-up would be
higher than the own pension and the total net pension income (own net pension plus
top-up) above the average gross labor income in the sending country.
The denial of exportability for these minimum pension guarantees is fully in line with
EU legislation and the lack of reciprocity, as neither Morocco nor Turkey offers a mini-
mum old-age income guarantee to its citizens (they do offer minimum pensions for
those eligible for a pension benefit, as do their EU counterparts). As the own pension
benefit levels of Moroccan and Turkish retirees are typically well below those of their
EU counterparts—due to lower wages as well as shorter insurance periods—the share
of retirees with Moroccan and Turkish migration background that get such top-ups is
much higher, typically one third or more compared to about 10–15 % of the indigenous
population.
The lack of exportability of top-ups in addition to the loss of other local benefits and
services that old-age residents below the minimum income guarantee typically enjoy
(such as for housing, transportation, television fees, leisure activities) plus the loss of
access to better health care systems is claimed to contribute to low-return migration of
retirees (whether naturalized or with citizenship of the sending country).13
4.3.5 Centralized, efficient application processes
Application from the country of residency through a dedicated entry point, direct ad-
ministrative contacts between the diverse insurance funds, and centralized information
Table 8 Minimum income guarantee in old age (€ (rounded) per month as of January 2016)
Country Max guarantee single Max guarantee couple Example transfer for couplea Comments
Austria 883 1324 854 Paid 14 timesc
Germanyb 819 1143 673 Paid 12 times
Belgium 688 1032 562 Paid 12 times
France 800 1242 772 Paid 12 times
Source: Author, based on information provided on the websites of national social security institutions
aAssuming uniformity of own income/pension (net of health contributions) of €470 per month in each country
bCalculated on basic consumption need of €404 (728) plus acceptable rental costs (€345) and heating costs (€70)
per month
cAustrian salaries and pensions are paid with two extra installments per year (typically for June and December or a half
month addition every quarter) and taxed at a low flat rate of 6 % (for singles)
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access and a designated contact person are all conveniences that are not regulated in a
BSSA but are part of a country’s administrative capacity.
The processing of an application from Morocco and Turkey with insurance periods
in Europe only is facilitated by full informatization of insurance records in most of
these countries. As a result, applications to the east corridor countries once received by
postal communication can be responded in normal cases, by Austria and Germany,
with a preliminary approval within days and a definite approval within weeks. If add-
itional written records are required (as may be the case in the western corridor coun-
tries), the weeks will become months. If insurance periods were acquired in the
sending countries before or after returning home, then their collection and verification
can be time-consuming, particularly if the date of birth or name is unclear. If benefit
information from the sending country is required to establish totalization or the level
of top-ups when residing in the host country, the delay can be substantial as is the loss
of benefit disbursement or delayed payment of top-ups.
Turkey envisages moving to full computerization of insurance records by 2017. This
may apply to new and some older records, but full computerization of all records is
likely to be decades away and, thus, so is a quick application process. No information is
available about the ICT plans in Morocco.
4.3.6 Channels of pension payment
The benefit payment from a disbursing pension fund to an individual retiree is made
directly to an indicated bank account. This also occurs in transnational transactions in
the east corridor, whereby a retiree with Turkish residence informs the pension fund of
the account in which she/he wants the transfer made, in either Turkish lira or euros. If
the latter, the money cannot be touched until the 21st of the month to avoid fees. For
ease of transfer, Austria reportedly uses the German Postbank as an intermediary for
transfers to Turkey.
In the west corridor, transfers from France are also directly made to a nominated
individual bank account in Morocco; in Belgium, transfers are channeled through the
contact institution in Morocco (CNSS). In case of direct transfer, an annual proof of life
is requested; in the case of CNSS, the proof is processed by the disbursing unit.
4.3.7 Consistent taxation of pensions
Consistent taxation of pension benefits is a further requirement for portable pen-
sions. This issue is not addressed in BSSAs but left to bilateral double taxation
treaties (DTTs) between countries. The first goal of DTTs is to eliminate inter-
national double taxation or to reduce its effects. Most DTTs were established when
portable pensions were not yet an issue; as a result, BSSAs and DTTs are often
not consistent, and no conceptual guidance is available on how to make them so.
The general rule of DTTs is that pension benefits from social security institutions
are to be taxed in the country of residency, while those pension benefits from pub-
lic institutions (that is, civil servants’ pensions) are to be taxed by the source coun-
try. The reality is much more complex and confusing; the solution awaits a better
understanding of what is happening and conceptual guidance on how best to tax
(Holzmann 2015; Genser and Holzmann 2016).
Table 8 summarizes the tax treatment between the various BSSA partners. It shows
wide variation in taxation approaches, even within these four taxation corridors. Two
source countries (Germany and Belgium) tax pensions while two (Austria and France)
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do not. Of the two receiving countries, Turkey does not tax pensions at all (as pensions
are not considered taxable income). Morocco taxes pensions but not those from
Belgium (which are exempt due to a DTT) and offers very generous income tax allow-
ances for pensions from France (which are not source-taxed there) if the pensions are
paid to a Moroccan bank account and used locally.
Such differences in the tax treatment of pensions affect the fiscal neutrality of port-
ability arrangements well beyond those of BSSAs and are discussed again in Section 5.
4.4 Health care portability
Portability of health care benefits between countries is well-established within the EU
through a network of EU legislation and regulation and special bilateral arrangements.
Portability is either absent or only incompletely addressed in EU countries’ BSSAs with
third countries, however. While BSSAs with European countries outside the EU strive for
completeness, this is not the case for BSSAs with countries in other continents. When the
material scope does cover health or other benefits, the coverage is often limited (Spiegel
2010). As a result, the worldwide experience with portable health care benefits is much
more limited and conceptually and operationally much less streamlined than is the case
for pensions.
In this regard, the four BSSAs under investigation are an exception. Austria and
Germany’s BSSAs with Turkey (and the former Yugoslavia) contained health care
coverage from the very beginning. Belgium and France’s initial BSSAs with Morocco
contained very limited health care elements, as social health care programs were intro-
duced in Morocco only in 2005. The revised BSSAs of Belgium-Morocco (as of 2011)
and France-Morocco (not yet signed but with an AM as well as an Administrative
Agreement for implementation as of 2014) extend health care benefits to pension bene-
fit recipients in the other country; their introduction is reportedly under implementa-
tion (but little information is available about their operation).
Portability of health care benefits for migrant workers can be exemplified for a variety
of cases and situations:
(a)A foreign (migrant) worker’s access (and any family residing with him) to a host
country’s mandated health system is usually but not always the same as that of a
national worker. For example, waiting periods are typically waived in the BSSA to
make workers equal from the very first day. In contrast and as an example, Australia
requires migrant workers (and their family members) to be self-covered under a
private health insurance contract for the first 2 years of residence and work.
(b)Reciprocal access of workers from the other countries to emergency health care in
case of traveling.
(c)Coverage by the home country of the migrant’s family left behind in the home
country and paid by the host country.
(d)Coverage of visiting family members left behind in the host country in case of
emergency.
(e)Coverage of a pension recipient from one country taking residency in the other
country.
(f ) Temporary coverage of such a residing retiree in the country of pension payment
for emergency or pre-agreed treatment.
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While all these (and other) cases may form part of a BSSA, the focus of BSSAs with
selected third countries is typically and increasingly focused on contingencies that can
be controlled by the paying institutions (Spiegel 2010).
4.4.1 East corridors’ BSSAs and health care portability
The east corridors’ BSSAs (Austria-Turkey and Germany-Turkey) offer an arrangement
similar to the treatment within the EU that includes immediate health care coverage for
foreign workers; emergency coverage of workers and family members when traveling in
the other country; coverage for pre-agreed treatment in the other country; coverage of
nonresident family members by their home country institution; and coverage in the coun-
try of pension receipt. The last component is typically the most difficult to implement, al-
beit the issues around medical claims for visiting migrants and family members may
create the most complaints.
With respect to family left behind, under the east corridors’ BSSAs, the spouse, chil-
dren, and sometimes other family members (such as parents) are provided benefits in
kind by the partner health insurance organization. The family left behind is officially
registered with the partner insurance and receives the same benefits as other nationals.
The insurance fund in the migrant-sending country receives yearly compensation calcu-
lated on real costs or on a lump-sum basis.
When family members visit the working member in the host country, their access to
health care benefits is covered in case of emergency (as for other covered tourists), sub-
ject to administrative procedures, such as an exchange of the residency health insur-
ance for visitors’ insurance. The costs of such intervention are subtracted from the
amounts due, which typically flow in much higher volume in the other direction—as a
lump sum or for real costs.
The standard approach to establishing portable health care for mobile retirees is as
follows: a retiree with a pension from Austria or Germany who establishes residency in
Turkey (as a return migrant or a snowbird, with either nationality) is eligible for the
Turkish health care system upon residency and registration with the Turkish social se-
curity scheme, with the same access to the health care system as any other insured per-
son. The contribution payment and expenditure responsibility depend on whether the
retiree’s Austrian or German pension is his/her only pension benefit or if s/he also has
a Turkish pension benefit. If the latter, s/he pays (only) the Turkish contribution rate
and the Turkish health insurance is fully responsible for all health care expenditures,
however high his/her foreign pension(s). If the retiree has only an Austrian or German
pension, s/he pays the corresponding Austrian or German contribution rate on his/her
pension benefit (deducted at source) while the Turkish health insurance claims reim-
bursement from the relevant Austrian or German institution. This arrangement seems
straightforward but has a number of nuances:
(a)The host institution/country has an incentive to avoid any responsibility for pension
payment as this triggers full responsibility for health care outlays. This is the case in
Turkey, where current or former Turkish nationals may cover insurance periods
outside Turkey with an additional voluntary lump-sum contribution payment upon
return to the social insurance pension scheme. Turkey claims that this payment is
for life insurance and thus does not trigger health care responsibility, but this
position is reportedly under consideration.
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(b)On the other hand, taking full responsibility for all health care outlays is inequitable
if the main share of the retirement (pension) income is from abroad. Such an
approach jeopardizes financial fairness between countries.
(c)Turkish expenditures for retirees by Austrian and German health care institutions
are reimbursed by applying flat-rate costs (for resident expenditure), while health
outlays during visits (own or covered family members) are reimbursed using actual
costs. During a dispute around the flat-rate costs, it emerged that Turkey applies
different family weights for Austria, France, and Germany in its calculation of
reimbursement: the weight used for Austria is much higher than that for Germany
but the weights of both are below that used for France.
(d)Some uncertainty reportedly remains about the right to health insurance for
temporary visits by insured members in own or other countries that are party to
the BSSA. This may lead to underreporting of outlays or to rejection of claims by
health insurers.
4.4.2 West corridors’ BSSAs and health care portability
Belgium and France’s initial BSSAs with Morocco covered only the health care costs of
traveling workers or their family members. The new France-Morocco BSSA of 2011
extends coverage to all health care contingencies outlined above and for retirees and
establishes a coverage and financing process (Article 16) equivalent to that of the east
corridors’ BSSA: in case of eligibility to health care benefits for a retiree from one
country who resides in the other country, the residence country provides the health
care services while the pension benefit disbursement country covers the cost (Article
16/1); in case of eligibility to health care benefits for retirees in both BSSA countries,
the residence country covers both benefit provision and financing (Article 16/3). The
new Belgium-Morocco BSSA is not yet finalized. However, an administrative arrange-
ment concluded and implemented in 2014 revises some health care-relevant articles of
the old and still valid BSSA but does not yet extend health care to retirees. Compared
to the east corridor, the situation is more complicated as the health care systems of
Belgium, France, and Morocco all follow a two-tier scheme in which basic health care
insurance is supplemented for much of the private sector labor force by contributions
to a mutual health insurance. As the recent BSSA revisions are now being imple-
mented, no information was available on how the multitier approach is addressed
across these countries.
4.5 Portability of family benefits
The pension and health care provisions discussed so far have major family provisions
that have not been discussed in detail herein, such as widows’ and orphans’ pensions
and access to health care in home country and host country during visits for family left
behind. Their access to these transfers and services depends—as a necessary condi-
tion—critically on the portability of benefits by the insured. No special issues emerged
regarding pensions except for the handling of repudiation/divorces and widows’ bene-
fits in the west corridor in view of possible multiple spouses in Morocco (not Turkey)
and with regard to access to health care provisions for visiting family members in the
host country.
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Regulation of the portability of other family benefits, most importantly in the form of
family or child allowances, is the most diverse and quite likely the most contentious
contingency across the four BSSAs, for many reasons:
(a)Family benefits are not really a social security contingency or social risk but a
redistributive instrument across individuals/families (from those with no children to
those with children) and across an individual’s life cycle (from a period without
children to a period with children).
(b)They may be financed through earmarked wage contributions but are more often
financed by general government revenues and thus do not establish an acquired
right that needs to be protected.
(c)As a redistributive instrument, it can be argued that migrant workers should not
profit to the same extent as national workers even if their children reside with
them; this argument is even stronger if children reside in the home country, away
from the worker.
(d)Even if the distributive argument toward migrants’ children holds, the level of
family benefits sent abroad may be reduced, as differences in purchasing power
need to be considered.
(e)As eligibility (for example, number of children abroad) cannot be easily verified, any
insurance argument for the existence of the benefit gets weaker.
(f ) If the migrant-receiving country does not provide such family benefits, the reciprocity
of benefits does not hold, violating a basic principle of BSSAs (for example, Turkey
does not provide family benefits, but Morocco provides social insurance-related family
benefits for up to six children).
Some of these considerations have led to changes in the portability rules for family
allowances across the four BSSAs. In 1996, Austria unilaterally canceled the BSSA; the
replacement agreement of 2000 is essentially the same but does not have a family
allowance (“Familienbeihilfe”). One of the main official arguments was the misuse of
the benefit, as the number of claimants’ children could not be verified in Turkey.
Germany faced similar issues and arguments but did not completely cancel the family
benefit (“Kindergeld”). Instead, it substantially reduced the amount transferred to eli-
gible children from Turkish workers in Turkey compared to those in Germany; it is
around one-tenth but varies with the number of children. Similar discussions took
place in Belgium and France but did not result in similar actions. The France-Morocco
BSSA of 2011 restricts the family benefits sent abroad to cover at most four children
(Article 16/6), but discussions were held about lifting the restrictions. According to the
Belgium-Morocco BSSA, benefit eligibility is restricted to the pure family allowance
(“prestations familiales”) without special benefits or increases (Article 27/2).
5 Evaluating the BSSAs according to criteria fulfillment
This section presents the findings of the BSSAs’ evaluation against the three criteria
outlined at the beginning, covering both equity and efficiency considerations: fairness
for individuals, fiscal fairness for countries, and bureaucratic effectiveness for all
involved.
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5.1 Fairness for individuals
Section 2 outlined the conceptual framework for portability and defined fairness for
individuals as no benefit disadvantage with regard to pension and health care for mi-
grants and their dependents. Thus, one’s movements between host countries or back to
the home country should not lead to lower pension benefits or gaps in health coverage
than if one stayed in one country.
Desk reviews of the four BSSAs as well as interviews with the responsible managers
in national security institutions and ministries and representatives from migrants’ orga-
nizations suggest comprehensive and well-working agreements, with very few gaps or
issues on the table.14 In none of the four corridors does the BSSA create a major bene-
fit disadvantage that affects mobility on a large scale. With the implementation of full
health care benefits for mobile workers between France/Belgium and Morocco, the
remaining benefit gaps, which created some but limited unfairness, are being closed: in
the two-tier structure of health care insurance, mobile retirees now pay additional con-
tributions to get local health care access.
The BSSAs in all four corridors broadly offer the expected pension portability for
mobile workers, with no reported issues around the lack of take-up of benefits. A few
important outstanding issues remain, particularly around the nonportability of noncon-
tributory pension top-ups, requests for retroactive payment, and (for the west corri-
dors) the handling of repudiation/divorces and widows’ benefits.
The interviews did not suggest that pension benefits are forfeited at any sizable scale
due to lack of information for eligible return migrants about their pension rights or be-
cause enabling administrative environments do not exist to apply for and get their ben-
efits. The validity of this statement could potentially be verified by using host countries’
insurance databases—at least in Austria and Germany where the migration back-
grounds of the insured are known. One issue raised around benefit take-up concerned
the more frequent informal labor status of migrants who moved at the beginning of the
labor migration in the 1960s and who do not have pension rights (or have them at a
lower level). One corridor-specific issue concerned Germany: in the 1970s, return mi-
grants to Turkey were allowed to cash in a lump-sum payment, an action that many
beneficiaries reportedly later regretted.
Nonportability of noncontributory pension top-ups was raised for all four corridors
by migrants’ organizations and migrant-sending countries’ administrations, and the
associated mobility implications are documented in the migration literature. In essence,
while nonportability can be justified on equity and insurance grounds, it risks creating
a kink in potential return migrants’ intertemporal budget constraints, affecting their re-
turn decision. With the top-up and other amenities, migrants are financially better off
staying in the host country than returning to their home country. However, the limited
return of migrants to their former home country seems to be motivated by incentives
well beyond mere financial considerations: access to a more advanced health care sys-
tem in the host country (albeit those in Turkey and Morocco have made significant
progress); family roots established in the host country (due to family reunifications in
recent decades); or estrangement over decades from family left behind.
One new contingency not covered under the investigated BSSAs (nor in any BSSA or
European regulation to the author’s knowledge) concerns the lack of portability of man-
dated long-term care insurance introduced in Germany in the 1990s. The acquired
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rights are not portable for individuals when moving abroad, and thus, the payment of
1 % of salary forfeited becomes a tax. This problem, however, does not exist only for
the east corridors but also affects mobility within the EU (as the author of this article
can attest; see also Deutsche Welle 2013).
Another concern for individual fairness is the lack of retroactivity for payment of
social security benefits. When pension applications are delayed—because of late sub-
mission, difficulties in verifying data, or any other reason—the pensioner loses access
to any benefits owed up until the application is authorized. Migrants’ organizations are
therefore calling for a provision on retroactivity in revised BSSAs. However, the host
countries’ administrations prefer the alternative approach of reassembling the contribu-
tory data well before the retirement date, which may prove more effective and in line
with what other countries have done or are preparing.
Last but not least, repudiation and distribution of the survivor’s pension may create a
fairness issue in the west corridors. Moroccan civil law (Mudawana) allows two types
of dissolution of marriage: divorce and repudiation. Divorce requires spouses to go to
the Tribunal to formally dissolve the marriage, which can be very costly and time-
consuming (Ouali 1992). Repudiation enables one spouse to unilaterally break the con-
tract, which limits costs and duration. This is why men—and in a small number of
cases, women—use repudiation more often than divorce. However, repudiation is not
always recognized as valid in Belgian civil law for Moroccan resident in Belgium. This
can lead to a risk of polygamy and can also affect both pension rates and the distribu-
tion of the survivor’s pension for spouses.
Both west corridors’ BSSAs foresee the splitting of the survivor’s pension when polyg-
amy exists: prorated and according to length of marriage in France, with possibility of
review after the death of one spouse (France-Morocco BSSA Article 31/1) and equally
and definitely in Belgium and Morocco (Belgium-Morocco BSSA Article 24/1). The
provisions do not provide clear guidance in relation to spouses’ nationality, however. If
both are Moroccan nationals, it seems evident that Article 24 is applied since the
national law permits polygamy. However, if one of the spouses is not a Moroccan
national and instead is a national of a country where both repudiation and polygamy
are prohibited (which is the case for Belgian nationals), Article 24 cannot be applied.
5.2 Fiscal fairness for countries
Evaluating fiscal fairness requires a benchmark against which to assess the impact of a
BSSA and thus portability of benefits. The simple version of such a benchmark states
that no participating country should have a fiscal advantage or be harmed by the agree-
ment, but the meaning of this needs to be assessed in context. Fiscal neutrality for both
countries does not mean that both do not economically benefit from the agreement
compared with the situation in its absence (for example, through higher labor market
formality).
5.2.1 Financial fairness—pension regulations
Portability of pensions means that income generated in one country is transferred to
another country, not dissimilar to remittances sent from migrant-receiving to migrant-
sending countries, that is, a shift in purchasing power (Jousten 2012). It corresponds to
the export of factor income (labor income for unfunded pensions and capital income
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for funded pensions) from the factor-using to the factor-providing country. If the pen-
sion benefit design is actuarially fair, then neither the transfer of acquired rights nor
benefits in disbursement impede fiscal fairness. This may, however, be the case when
the benefits contain significant distributive design components that are also transferred
or in case of significant differences in life expectancy among socioeconomic groups that
disadvantage lower-income groups, such as migrants, that would not be compensated.
At the moment, the size of such unintended transfer components is unknown, as is the
extent to which they may cancel out. The lack of a BSSA and thus portability of pen-
sion benefits clearly fiscally profits the host country—as no benefits are paid to return
migrants and prior contributions were cashed—while the home country is fiscally hurt
as it may have to compensate for the lack of portable old-age pensions through own
and locally financed assistance benefits.
The pension structure of all countries in the investigated BSSAs follows an earnings-
related design that becomes more actuarially shaped and more fiscally fair with each
reform. Major fiscal unfairness may emerge, however, through the high (and at times
increasing) level of government transfers to cover the increasing imbalance between
pension contributions (from employee and employer) and pension outlays. In all host
countries, a significant share of pension expenditure is paid by budgetary transfers (up
to one third).
A significant and so far little discussed source of fiscal unfairness may come from
outside the pension system, in the treatment of contributions, interest earned, and ben-
efits disbursed in the tax system. Because tax deductions have been granted to pensions
during the accumulation phase (for example, through nontaxation of contributions and
interest earned) that would be recovered through the taxation of benefits when dis-
bursed, fiscal neutrality may be hurt but not under all circumstances. Nontaxation of
returns on retirement savings may not be a privilege but merely the taxation principle
under a consumption-type tax treatment. On the other hand, beneficiaries may also be
taxed twice: during the accumulation phase in the working country when contributions
are non-tax-deductible and then again at retirement if pensions are fully taxed in the
residency country of retirement. Yet, the taxes levied in the new recipient country may
simply pay for the public goods and services provided. The tax transfer mechanism
may include age-related transfers when beneficiaries are young (for example, child
allowances and housing subsidies) that are recovered when they are older, including
when drawing a pension. Then, the pension-sending country would lose and the
pension-receiving country would gain.
As Table 9 highlighted, the tax treatment of portable pension benefits in the home
country varies tremendously across the four corridors. This heterogeneous tax treat-
ment is bound to create fiscal unfairness among countries even without spelling out in
which direction (this is done in the individual corridor studies). The amount of tax
expenditure in the tax source (and pension host) country and how the taxation rights
of pensions in disbursement should best be arranged between source and residency
country are empirically unknown and conceptually and operationally unclear. This area
of international coordination of financial flows has until now been left largely to the
legal profession and to its treatment in DTTs—the BSSA equivalent for taxation issues.
The international taxation of portable pensions and how best to establish individual
and fiscal fairness with minimal bureaucratic hassles is still unknown territory. Yet, to
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clarify the concepts and get a better understanding of the flows involved, some first
research steps have been launched.15
5.2.2 Financial fairness—health care regulations
Public health care systems are typically designed to give everyone access to a compre-
hensive set of services. Contributions are typically flat or a fixed share of income, while
expenditures rise strongly with age. When developing countries send more young net
contributors abroad and receive more elderly net beneficiaries, their public health sys-
tems are burdened. On the other hand, migrant women who give birth to children in
the host country burden this health care system more during this episode relative to
the revenues they contribute. Worldwide, no arrangement is in place to share the sav-
ings components of health care provisions of a migrant who contributed to the public
health institutions of various countries (Werding and McLennan 2015; Holzmann and
Koettl 2015).
Under the BSSAs investigated, two key elements may negatively affect the fiscal pos-
ition of the country that provides health care benefits for mobile retirees:
(a)The full expenditure responsibility of the residence country for all health care
outlays if the retiree receives a pension from this country, however small compared
to other (pension) income from abroad. This creates a health cost disadvantage if
return migrants have only a small home and large host pension benefit, and health
care contributions are only levied on the home pension, as currently seems to be
the case in the corridors; if contributions are levied on all pension income received,
contribution revenues may still not be cost covering. For the assessment of the
latter, age-related (not average) cost coverage should matter, which is not the
current practice.
(b)The “across-the-board” compensation from the host country that also pays a
retiree’s only pension. While three methods are used internationally for health cost
recovery, Turkey currently uses the across-the-board method for retirees. The alter-
natives are “actual values” (that is, real costs incurred by the insured) and “average
values” calculated on actual outlays over four quarters of the year. Actual values are
used for emergency cost recovery for temporary eligible visitors. Across-the-board
cost recovery is certainly administratively less burdensome (albeit private insurers
use actual values) but may lead to major underpayment for older health care
beneficiaries.
Viewed in this context, the current approach of portable health care may be seen as
fiscally unfair to Turkey, but this assumes that cost recovery is based on across-the-
Table 9 Taxation of pension benefits by origin of payment and residency of recipient
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board values related to actual outlays. This may not be the case. During quality checks,
fluctuations in the average health care costs presented by Turkey that could not be
explained by real developments attracted the attention of Austrian authorities. In com-
paring Turkey’s calculation bases with those of Germany and France, Turkey was found
to be using different family weights (recall Section 4.4.1). Following negotiations, the
same family factor used for Germany is now also used for Austria (Wieninger 2013).
For Turkey, the main concern related to health care benefits is due to new levies im-
posed on pension income by the EU. The EU changed its internal regulations in 2002
and introduced supplementary premiums from pensions for health services. Turkey has
argued that this practice is at odds with the provisions in the BSSA and unfairly affects
residents of states that are not members of the EU’s common social security system.16
In summary, it is not clear whether fiscal neutrality of portable health care is achieved
in the current BSSAs and existing legal environments. This ambiguity may be due less
to the lack of a conceptual framework (Holzmann and Koettl 2015; Werding and
McLennan 2015) and more to a traditional and disputed implementation as well as dif-
ferences in how countries themselves finance their health care provisions.
5.3 Bureaucratic effectiveness
Critical elements required to keep the bureaucratic burden low for migrants and social
security institutions include appropriate information for potential beneficiaries, timely
records on insurance periods, and electronic communications and file exchange
between institutions. In all four investigated BSSAs, room for improvement exists in all
three elements.
5.3.1 Available information sources for migrants
Due to the age structure of migrants, their pensions represent a comparatively recent
issue, and not all eligible persons may be aware of the BSSAs’ provisions. Furthermore,
migrant retirees from emerging economies often have a low educational level and are
not used to contact with the social security administration. In addition, they face lan-
guage barriers and have often had discriminatory experiences with the administration.
These factors can contribute to retirees’ difficulties in understanding their benefits.
Advisory services provided by both home and host countries can play a part in over-
coming these barriers.
Overall, advisory services provided by Austria and Germany are generally viewed
favorably by migrants. In both Austria and Germany, three key actors offer information
and support: (a) social security institutions, which reach out to (Turkish) migrants
through a diverse set of interventions, including regional information and support ses-
sions; (b) the social attaché of the Turkish embassy, which advises Turkish citizens on
pension and health insurance issues; and (c) migrants’ organizations, which offer infor-
mation and facilitate links between migrants and the social security administration (for
details, see Holzmann et al. 2016a, 2016b).
Three types of interventions are currently used in Belgium, France, and Morocco to
inform potential beneficiaries of the contents and coverage of the BSSA: institutional
contact centers, information sessions, and direct communication with beneficiaries. It
is relatively easy for pensioners to liaise with contact center staff. However, information
sessions organized by Office National des Pensions in the Moroccan cities with the
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largest population of returnees often struggle to reach a large number of potential
beneficiaries. Privacy concerns can exacerbate this. For example, past requests by
Moroccan institutions to Belgium to share potential beneficiaries’ contact details avail-
able in the Belgian administrative database have been rejected by Belgium for privacy
reasons. In the future, both countries will need to pursue avenues to ensure migrant
retirees’ access to social security rights without breaches of privacy.
While information provision by the host countries seems to work well overall, local
advisory services provided by public institutions in both Morocco and Turkey are
viewed by migrants’ organizations as inadequate, with a lot of room for improvement.
The most common complaint is that administrative staff are not fully informed on the
BSSAs’ contents and administrative processes and thus they cannot provide adequate
information to clients. No information is currently available about information material,
visitor statistics, advising sessions, and so on.
5.3.2 Delays in the application process
It takes longer to process cross-national pension applications than national pensions.
Frequent delays occur during the confirmation of the extent of insurance periods in
Morocco and Turkey, as local institutions must generate individual insurance data from
documents provided in paper form by regional offices. The list of insurance periods is
collected only at the time of a pension application, and account clearances with yearly
entitlement announcements do not exist. Thus, for example, the pension application
for the Austrian or German part is processed very quickly as the domestic insurance
file is essentially ready at the time of application, but in Turkey, the process may take
many months (for details see Holzmann et al. 2016a, 2016b). Similar experiences are
also reported for the west corridors.
Difficult cases of pension application or access to health care are brought to the
attention of periodic bilateral meetings, but the involved parties attempt to handle such
cases beforehand using informal electronic interactions and other communications.
5.3.3 Electronic data exchange and modernization
The EU corridor countries generally intend to subject older agreements to a collective
revision, as both the EU and national regulations have been further developed (for ex-
ample, related to data protection regulations). Electronic data exchange would improve
both the fight against fraud (for example, disclosure of a double submission of bills)
and cooperation between institutions (for example, ascertainment of the actual primary
residence of a pensioner).
The implementation of ITC-based exchanges between EU and neighboring countries
can be inspired by the dedicated ITC system at the core of the multilateral agreement
MERCOSUR between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay (CIDI Consejo
Interamericana para el Desarrollo Integral 2015). This innovative ITC system is reliable
and trusted (generating a trace for each exchange in a trusted institution: Organizacion
Iberoamericana de Seguridad Social; is separate from that of each national participating
social institution but can be easily linked to; has strong data protection and privacy
features; enables effective and efficient data exchange that reduces time require-
ments between countries from months to days; and is easy to install and use (as it
is web-based). The ongoing development includes an automatic payment manage-
ment to avoid bank fees; allows for direct transfer in local currency (eliminating
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the need to transfer using US dollar transactions); and offers a compensation sys-
tem to reduce transfers (Ruggia-Frick 2011, 2015).
6 Conclusions
The overall conclusions from the four investigated corridors are relatively encouraging.
The four investigated BSSAs seem to be broadly working, with only a few areas of con-
tention and recognized areas for improvement. With some exceptions, this assessment
essentially holds for all three criteria used to evaluate the BSSAs: fairness for individ-
uals, fiscal fairness for countries, and bureaucratic effectiveness.
Fairness for individuals: BSSAs do not create a major benefit disadvantage that affects
mobility on a large scale in any of the four corridors. Implementation of full health
care benefits for mobile workers between France/Belgium and Morocco will close a
remaining relevant benefit gap. The BSSAs offer the expected pension portability for
mobile workers, with no major issues around the lack of benefit take-up. A few
important outstanding issues remain, particularly the nonportability of noncontribu-
tory pension top-ups, requests for retroactive payment, and (for the West corridor)
the handling of repudiation/divorces and widows’ benefits. Family allowances remain
an issue for discussion, and different outcomes across the corridors may prevail.
Fiscal fairness for countries: The pension systems’ evaluation yields a mixed picture.
For the four BSSAs considered, their increasingly actuarial pension benefit structure
helps in the pursuit of fairness; high and increasing levels of budgetary transfers to
keep pension systems afloat have a counter effect. For health care systems, it is unclear
whether and to what extent fiscal fairness is or can be achieved under the current
responsibility and reimbursement structure and how important the problem is.
Bureaucratic effectiveness: Stakeholders gave EU host countries’ institutions high
marks for their provision of benefit-related information and services but had a less
favorable assessment for their home countries. A concern for many applicants is the
delay in processing; the advantages of advanced electronic file preparation in some but
not all EU countries are attenuated by the paper-based information collection systems
in Morocco and Turkey; the situation is further aggravated by verification issues for
names and birth dates. Electronic file exchange systems across BSSAs are envisaged
and may soon take place in some corridors.
While the four corridor studies offer a lot of useful information and insights, they are
not rich enough to draw firm conclusions to drive major policy changes for BSSAs.
However, their comparison and individual evaluations in relation to the three criteria
do allow for some suggestions about next steps, including thoughts about policy devel-
opments, and invite some reflections, such as:
Does portability or its absence matter? If so, is it for labor mobility or social risk
management; for what phase of labor mobility—departing, staying, or returning—and
for what part of risk management—pension, health, and so on? The findings in the
corridor studies are consistent with sparse empirical evidence that departure
consideration may be little influenced by the presence or absence of portability (even if
the reviewed BSSAs from the 1960s were considered an important competitive
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element); for example, no BSSAs exist between Mexico and the USA or between Asian
and Gulf Cooperation Council countries, although these are the largest migration
corridors globally. This suggests implications for the risk management of migrants
(forcing own provisioning) and home countries (offering special arrangements such as
health care by Mexico and a range of support programs by the Philippines).
Portability arrangements seem to have some but limited effect on return migration
while some specificity of pension and health care provisions may make many migrants
stay on; for pensions, it is top-ups that seem to matter, while for health care, it is access
to high-quality care if needed. It would be interesting and relevant to experiment with
limited portability of top-ups and/or selective access to health care to former host coun-
tries for return migrants (including visas) to explore the mobility effects.
What are the conclusions, if any, for low-income countries/minimum requirements?
For a BSSA to be worthwhile, a developing country needs to have a sizable migration
corridor that offers its migrants access to receiving countries’ social security systems
(not the case in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Malaysia, Singapore, and so
on). However, the developing country should also have a (perhaps small) functioning
social security system or at least one or two well-operating schemes. Similarity
between the host and home country schemes also helps, or the host country will have
limited interest in engaging in a BSSA and no credibility with and interest by its own
migrants to participate at home and abroad. Furthermore, operation of the relevant
scheme should be computerized (ideally with a unique personal identification number),
have birth and death certificates, and have an institutional setup that takes care of its
migrants for departure, during their stay, and upon return.
What should lower-income countries pursue: a narrow or an ambitious approach to
BSSAs? A narrow approach with a focus on few benefits, particularly on pensions (old-
age, disability, and survivor’s), work injury, and health care for family members left
behind and visiting has higher chances of early success. Renegotiating the BSSA for
broader benefits such as family allowance and health care in retirement when the
migration corridor intensifies and domestic equivalents are created is possible but
requires a more lengthy process. Striving from the very beginning for a comprehensive
BSSA and benefit coverage as within the EU may not be very promising and would
need to build on a very strong migration corridor. Current signals from the EU indi-
cate a reluctance to include health care in future third country agreements.
Are private sector provisions easier to make portable? Not necessarily, and in any case,
this would only be relevant for long-term contingencies—retirement and health care.
Private saving offers a first defense against many financial risks in life, and money
should be easy to carry when moving from country to country. However, finding reli-
able financial institutions at home and abroad to park the money remains a challenge.
In addition, private sector pension arrangements often profit from tax privileges during
the accumulation phase that countries increasingly take back when leaving the country
and the exit tax may be sizable. Private health care insurance is not easily portable
between countries (or even within countries) so that sizable savings elements get lost
when moving. Even within the EU, private provisions (for pension and health care) are
much less portable than public and mandated ones. This has given rise to pan-
European or international private programs in health and preparation of a pan-
European fund for supplementary pension benefits.
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The recommendations for the next steps to better understand BSSAs to offer relevant
policy proposals for redesign and implementation focus on the research agenda, as im-
portant data, relevant concepts, and empirical evidence are still missing. Main research
elements include the following:
(a)The information base should be broadened with further south-north corridor stud-
ies for other regions as well as studies for north-north corridors (inside and outside
the EU) and south-south corridors within and outside multilateral agreements.
(b)Future corridor studies should spend more resources and time on development of a
full result framework and the collection of micro- and macroeconomic data from
social security institutions and beyond. This would allow for rigorous quantitative
evaluation of BSSAs according to the proposed and other criteria.
(c) Independent of corridor studies, countries should be encouraged to provide much
more information about portability-related flows and transactions between coun-
tries and to offer administrative data (as anonymized files) for research purposes.
(d)Future evaluations should profit from progress in the conceptual and empirical
deepening of fiscal fairness, particularly for pension and health care programs.
(e)Such conceptual extensions would profit from in-depth empirical analysis of the
current health care corridors and their financing and reimbursement mechanisms.
(f ) A better analytical foundation is needed to determine which benefits should get
priority in BSSAs and which should be dropped. While comprehensiveness may be
laudable, it comes at a price, namely a BSSA’s delayed finalization or
implementation.
(g)Regardless of their overall design, future BSSAs will profit enormously from having
a monitoring and evaluation framework built in from the very beginning.
It is strongly hoped that this project will motivate further corridor studies in different
regional and economic settings and that its research methodology will be used to test
the findings’ resonance and explore their broader applicability or rejection.
Endnotes
1For some corridor countries, better cross-sectional data are available but cannot
be easily transformed into longitudinal data and compared with similar data across
countries. For some of the German data on pensions to Germans and foreigners,
see Himmelreicher and Keck (2015).
2For the individual corridor studies, see Holzmann et al. 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d.
For a comparison across the east corridors, see Fuchs and Pacaci-Elitok 2014; for the
west corridors, see Legros et al. 2014 and Wels et al. 2015 (in French). For an elabor-
ation of broader principles and further country experiences with portability, see the
papers in a special volume of CESifo Economic Studies 2015 and the overview paper
by Holzmann and Werding 2015.
3Portability issues continue existing also within countries, most importantly between
the public and private sector and between states and regions in federal countries such
as China. These are ignored in this paper.
4Some authors claim that in a second-best world, imperfect portability could be
welfare-improving in the presence of several market failures (see, for example, Becker
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1964; Lazear 1979; and Fabel 1994). While these arguments may have some validity for
national labor markets, it is doubtful that such a human Tobin tax through imperfect
portability is relevant in cases of cross-border mobility, as the other involved costs will
remain high.
5For some historic and legal background on BSSAs, see Strban (2009); for a review of
issues of BSSAs with non-members within the EU context, see Spiegel (2010); for a
legal analysis of social security coordination with southern and eastern Europe, see ILO
(International Labour Organization) (2012); for a review of literature, see Taha et al.
(2015). For the texts of the bilateral social security agreements worldwide, see the ILO
NATLEX database: www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex4.search?p_lang=en.
6Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the
Palestinian Authorities.
7For an analysis of EU member states’ BSSAs with third countries, including com-
parison tables of the contents of these BSSAs, see Spiegel (2010).
8A recent analysis by the Organization of American States on the regional function-
ing of bilateral and multilateral social security agreements is a useful step (CIDI Con-
sejo Interamericana para el Desarrollo Integral 2015). The study offers an informative
description of the history and status of the agreements; yet, the analysis assesses only
the legal content of the agreements without any benchmark and outcomes.
9See Gsir et al. (2015) for a recent corridor report on Belgium and the immigrants
from Morocco and Turkey.
10For the east corridor, see Fuchs and Pacaci-Elitok (2014). For the west corridor, see
Legros et al. (2014) and Wels et al. 2015 (in French).
11See Holzmann et al. (2016a, 2016b) for the Austria-Turkey and Germany-Turkey
corridors; Holzmann et al. (2016c) for the Belgium-Morocco corridor; and Holzmann
et al. (2016d) for the French-Morocco corridor. All corridor papers can be found at the
World Bank website www.worldbank.org/en/topic/socialprotectionlabor.
12This abstracts from the moving 500-year military frontier between the Hapsburg
Empire and the Turkish Empire between the fall of Constantinople (1453) and the
nineteenth century and the population movement involved.
13The data by social security institution offer information on how many pensions are
paid abroad but typically do not allow individuals to be distinguished by nationality or
country of origin. As a result, a pension paid to Morocco can be paid to a Moroccan
with Moroccan nationality, a naturalized Moroccan, or a French snowbird. Similarly, it
is unknown how many pensions paid in EU countries are to naturalized migrants and
how many to foreign passport holders. However, information about migration streams
between countries (which may include migrants from both sending and receiving coun-
tries) signals limited return migration shortly before or after retirement.
14In the individual corridor studies, references to these interviews are made and in-
cluded in the list of references if permission was given by the interviewees. The minutes
of all interviews are available for further research purposes but for confidentiality rea-
sons cannot be made public. The author would again like to thank all those who made
themselves available for interviews; they contributed significantly to the understanding
of BSSAs and their intricacies. All remaining errors are the author’s own.
15To explore and develop the under-researched topic of the taxation of pensions, in-
cluding the issue of the taxation of portable benefits, the Center for Economic Studies &
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Ifo Institute CESifo (Munich) and the Centre of Excellence In Population Ageing
Research CEAPR (Sydney) initiated a project with workshops in Sydney (held in
November 2014) and Munich (held in September 2015). For details of programs
and output, see http://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/events/Archive/conferences/
2015/09/2015-09-03-tag15-Holzmann.html. The revised papers are published as
CESifo Working Papers at https://www.cesifo-group.de/ifoHome/publications/work-
ing-papers/CESifoWP.html, including the policy issue paper on the taxation of
internationally portable pensions; see Genser and Holzmann (2016). A book publi-
cation is under preparation.
16The new regulation also applies to Austrian residents in receipt of an Austrian pub-
lic pension and health insurance who also receive a public pension from an EU mem-
ber state. A health insurance contribution is levied on the pension from abroad as
health care benefits are provided locally.
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